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I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT decades had witnessed gradual liberalization of electric power sectors in a number of markets with restructuring of vertically-integrated utilities into power generation, supply, and transmission/distribution businesses. Unbundling of competitive sectors from naturally monopolistic businesses paved the way to introduction of free market pricing for power. We will consider the power markets based on the nodal pricing [1] - [3] and focus on the sensitivity of the locational marginal prices (LMP) with respect to infinitesimal nodal injections of costless power. The sensitivity analysis of LMP naturally arises in a number of problems including profit maximization of a generation firm with market power [4] .
Consider the firm operating generating units located in a set of nodes . Let denote power injection of the corresponding generating unit in node (bus) at our be the corresponding nodal price, be the firm power production cost function, then in the absence of binding constraints on variables , the first-order conditions for profit optimization problem for selling all power at the DAM nodal prices implies which gives where the summation is performed over all nodes of the network with 's generating units and all hours of the DAM period. Equation (1) implies that additional revenue received by the firm due to the exercise of the market power is set by the symmetric part of the nodal price response matrix
. If the matrix is negative semi-definite, then RHS of (1) is non-negative and the firm receives non-negative markup due to its market power. That is why symmetry and sign definiteness of the nodal price response matrix is of special interest for both market players and regulators.
The sensitivity problem for one-period DAM has been extensively studied in [5] - [9] for DC model, i.e., for the case of linear constraints without intertemporal constraints (such as ramping constraints). In [5] - [9] using sensitivity analysis of the firstorder conditions of the corresponding optimization problem, it was established that in DC model, the nodal price response matrix is symmetric and negative (semi-)definite matrix. In [9] the closed form solution for the nodal price response matrix was obtained in DC model for a piece-wise quadratic cost function. The approach utilized in [5] - [9] heavily relies on the special structure of the first-order conditions in DC model and explicit expression for nodal price response matrix obtained from sensitivity analysis of the first-order conditions. For the case of linear constraints with quadratic power production cost function, the price response matrix is constant in each interval with unaltered set of binding constraints.
Full optimal power flow model with set unit commitment schedule for multi-period DAM accounts for transit losses in electric lines, ramping constraints, etc., and hence includes nonlinear constraints as well as intertemporal constraints. In the case of nonlinear constraints, the price response matrix is not constant even for quadratic power production cost function (and may have significantly different sensitivity values for the large power systems with transit power losses), thus making the solution of the supplier profit maximization problem more challenging. Since binding intertemporal constraints may change the outcome of the nodal price response matrix calculation, they should be taken into account.
We study the multi-period DAM with nonlinear and intertemporal constraints (i.e., the cases when the explicit expression for the price response matrix is unavailable) and illustrate that symmetry and negative (semi-)definiteness of the matrix follow from more general conditions on the underlying optimization problem without use of explicit expression for the matrix. Thus, the main contribution of the present paper is to extend the results of [5] - [9] to the case of multi-period DAM with nonlinear and intertemporal constraints to show that the symmetry of nodal price response matrix originates from general properties of the Lagrange multipliers, when exogenous parameters enter additively in the binding constraints, satisfying the linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ), while the negative (semi-)definiteness of the nodal price response matrix is readily obtained in this framework for the instance of convex constraints (which incorporates the DC model case as well). As in [9] , we require LICQ because, in contrast to other more general constraint qualification conditions, it implies that the binding constraint set locally does not induce any constraints on the additive exogenous parameters, so that their values can vary independently and partial derivatives over the parameters can be considered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to application of the general statements to LMP, which are further generalized in Section III, Section IV provides illustration of the findings for the case with binding intertemporal constraint, Section V contains conclusion, and in Section VI, we recall general properties of the Lagrange multipliers' derivatives with respect to parameters entering the constraints additively. Throughout the paper, we adopt LICQ as constraint qualification condition.
II. DAM WITH FIXED UNIT COMMITMENT SCHEDULE
Consider wholesale multi-period day ahead electric power market (DAM) with set unit commitment schedule operating on bid-based security constrained economic dispatch principle according to the financially binding offers/bids supplied by wholesale market players. Let DAM with hourly locational marginal pricing be cleared simultaneously for all hours of the next day based on the optimization of the market utility (objective) function with optimization (decision) variables taking values in (where denotes a cardinality of a set). Variables are decomposed into hourly nodal power injection/withdrawal variables and variables , describing the hourly power flow in the system (for example, in DC model variables are identified with phase angles of nodal voltage levels, in full AC model include hourly power flow volumes in each line of the network, nodal voltage magnitudes and phase angles, etc.). For simplicity, we assume that there is only one generation or consumption unit in each node and denote the corresponding nodal power injection/withdrawal volume in hour by , with being total number of nodes in the system. Thus, and . The feasible set of produced by constraints , involving both constraints in the form of equalities as well as those in the form of weak inequalities, is assumed to be nonempty compact subset of Euclidean space . (To ensure compactness of the feasible set and avoid dealing with multiple physically equivalent solutions to DAM problem differing in phase angles values by multiples, the set includes constraints on phase angles values limiting their feasible values to the corresponding close intervals with widths less than ).
The DAM optimization problem has the form (2) with market utility function , where and are additively separable total daily cost of power consumption as bid by the consumers and the total daily cost of power as offered by the producers, respectively. It is assumed that market players submit distinct bids/offers with respect to each consumption/generation unit. If consumers may submit only totally inelastic DAM bids, then usually the term is omitted from the function , and the set is properly extended to account for the fixed consumption volumes.
We assume that the constraint functions are twice continuously differentiable functions of and the bid/offered prices are piece-wise continuous functions of the respective injection/withdrawal volumes; hence, the function is continuous. Compactness of the feasible set and continuity of the objective function ensure that its maximum value is attainable. In what follows, we also assume that (2) has a unique maximizer, which we denote by .
The set typically includes transmission constraints due to the power flow thermal or security limits, nodal power balance equations, power losses and power flow equations (Kirchhoff laws), and generating unit constraints. The latter account for minimal/maximal output volumes, ramping rates, fuel constraints, etc. Let us denote a subset of , binding at , by and partition the latter as follows: (3) with constraint subset describing generation and consumption unit constraints, which are assumed to be functions of injection/consumption volumes in that node only (possibly in different hours), subset being a set of hourly nodal power balance constraints of the form , with "plus" sign if corresponds to power consumption and with "minus" sign in the case of power generation, , subset being attributed to electric power flow equations, network power flow limits, etc., with subscripts " ", " ", and " " referring to the constraint type and not being vector or matrix indices. We assume that a set of binding constraints has cardinality less than and satisfies constraint qualification condition with respect to variables . In this setting, the nodal price in node at hour , which we denote by , equals the Lagrange multiplier to the constraint . We note that for different hours of the day the sets of binding inequality constraints can differ.
As the firm operates generating units located in a set of nodes , let denote the rest of the nodes in the system, and denote and , respectively, denote the offered costs by and denote the other market players contribution to the market utility function, so that . The sets of constraints assume the following structure:
The constraint set is referred to as reduced binding constraint set at . We observe that as well as (up to a sign) enter additively in the reduced constraint set functions.
Let us denote by the feasible set for , i.e., the set of such that there exists , so that satisfies the constraint set , and by the set of all those for a given value of . Fixing a feasible value of , we obtain an optimization subproblem of (2): (4) with being the optimal value of the market utility function when the firm supplies costless volumes of power in the corresponding nodes at respective hours of the day. The reduced binding constraint set specifies a set of binding constraints for the problem (4). We emphasize that the set may not satisfy constraint qualification for a given solution for of subproblem (4), and can be potentially redundant with some constraints being functions of the others. Relation of subproblem (4) to the problem (2) is given by (5) Note that some of the constraints , like , impose restrictions on only and involve neither nor . However, in general case the constraints may also imply some additional implicit constraints on , including the binding ones. Hence, generally speaking, the set of binding constraints on variables only, implied by , may be larger than . Let us introduce costless power injections with being injection in node at hour of the day. That formally corresponds to a substitution in the nodal power balance constraint for a node at hour . The substitutions in generate and produce -dependent feasible set of : . Therefore, when are introduced, the problem (4) is considered for and the corresponding value function equals . Hence, if the Envelope Theorem (as stated in the Appendix) is applicable for (2) at , then we have the following identity for the nodal price at node at hour :
with (7) Equations (6) and (7) state that in general case, both and the binding constraints on , corresponding to the feasible set , are dependent on with two of these circumstances leading to nodal price dependence on bids/offers of the market players other than , while the latter circumstance being responsible for dependence on the firm offers. Dependence of on the bids/offers of market players needs some clarification. Deformation of a bid/offer of a market player may result in the corresponding change in DAM outcomes including the player's nodal consumption/injection volumes. Let us consider a set of all bids/offers of a market player which result in the same values of nodal injection/consumption volumes as outcomes of DAM. We will say that the nodal price is independent from the market player bid/offer, if any bid/offer from the above-mentioned set results in the same value of . In that sense, the function is independent from the firm offers from the above-mentioned set as it directly follows from (4). We would like to state conditions for a set of nodal prices in nodes for all hours of the day to be independent from the firm offers.
Proposition 1: If the following assumptions, additional to explicit assumptions stated in this section, are met: there exists such that 1) for any in -some neighborhood of -the problem (4) has a unique solution , and these functions are continuous in ; 2) in some neighborhood of , the function is twice continuously differentiable; 3) the set of constraints of the problem (4), binding at the solution of (4) for any in , is given by the reduced constraint set with cardinality no higher than ; 4) the set of binding constraints satisfies constraint qualification at the solution of (4) 
Thus, the set of nodal prices can be viewed as components of the gradient of function . Since the first-order conditions for (4) make subset of the first-order conditions for (2), we have . Hence, the nodal prices in nodes for all hours of the day are independent from firm offers (provided that the offers result in the same supply volumes as defined above). From (8) , it follows that in . If is weakly concave and the residual set of binding constraints is convex, then negative semi-definiteness of follows from considerations in the Appendix as Hessian matrices of and with respect to variables are negative semi-definite (with equality constraints not contributing to the latter). Moreover, if is strictly concave, then is negative definite. Thus, the Proposition 1 is proved.
Assumptions 3 and 4 of Lemma 1 imply that none of 's offers is marginal, which limits applicability of the lemma, while the other Lemma 1 assumptions are often proved to be valid in practical applications.
We also note that in the case of DC current model with (weakly) concave quadratic objective function, is constant matrix in . Although is feasible, we do not require as there may not be such an open neighborhood. Thus, the problem (4) is formally considered for all points , even the unfeasible ones. In this sense -the corresponding components of -are unconstrained and independent as long as the points belong to and hence the partial derivatives over can be considered. We also note that if the Envelope Theorem is applicable to the original problem (2) as well, the introduction of does not alter the set of binding constraints : in some neighborhood of , no new binding constraints are introduced and no binding constraint becomes nonbinding.
Since the reduced binding constraint set does not impose any additional constraints on variables , at the set is the set of binding constraints corresponding to 1 As our analysis requires frequent referrals to an open neighborhood of , which is some open subset of defined above, for simplicity, we will refer to that subset as as well and will tacitly assume that has been properly redefined. All the neighborhoods considered in this paper are assumed to be open neighborhoods.
the feasible set and satisfying constraint qualification as a subset of . For introduction of does not introduce explicit dependence on in , using (6) and the statement of Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we have (9) where we have used and the fact that -the solution for as a function of -is unique [which is implied by the assumption of the Envelope Theorem applicability for (2)].
Thus, if the problem (4) is considered only for , it may not be legitimate to take partial derivatives over ; thus, derivatives are taken over . However, due to the constraint qualification of , the problem (4) can be considered , thus enabling computation of partial derivatives over , which is manifest in (8) and (9) . That observation also entails that with is interpreted as hourly nodal price in given hour and node , when at each hour of the day and each node , the firm injects costless power in the amount of .
III. GENERALIZATION
In the previous section, we dealt with the specific properties of the nodal prices in nodes , containing generating units of the firm , provided that conditions of the Proposition 1 hold for all hours of the day. However, as the network power flow can change during the day, the power flow constraints may imply some binding constraints on variables only in a few hours of the day. To address that issue, we generalize the statement of the Proposition 1 to a subset of hours of the day to account for hour specific conditions. Let us partition -the set of possible values of composite index -into with . That induces a split of the variables into with . We note that for a particular node , the variable can belong to at a certain hour of a day and belong to at another hour of the day. Let us further assume that the constraints split into . Analogously to the treatment in the previous section, we define by the feasible set for , i.e., the set of such that there exists , so that satisfies the constraint set , and by the set of all those for a given value of . Let us define and -firm offer costs function for and , respectively-through , and define as . We also define (10) Introducing costless power injections for , we arrive at the following generalization of the Proposition 1.
Proposition 2: If the following assumptions, additional to explicit assumptions stated in Section II, are met: there exists such that 1) for any in -some neighborhood of -the problem (10) has a unique solution , and these functions are continuous in ; 2) in some neighborhood of the function is twice continuously differentiable; 3) the set of constraints of a problem (10) , binding at the solution of (10) for any in , is given by the reduced constraint set with cardinality no higher than ; 4) the set of binding constraints satisfies constraint qualification at the solution of (4) 
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider an example illustrating the findings in the case of a model involving binding intertemporal constraint. Consider one-node two-generating units model with DAM solved for a time period composed of two consecutive hours . Let demand be given by and in the first and second hour respectively with positive parameter having units of $/(MWh) , while nonnegative parameter and optimization variables having units of power volume. Let the firm supply units of power in hour , and the other firm , operating a generator with maximal output and upward ramping constrained by , offer a price to supply volume of power in the first hour, and a price to supply volume of power in the second hour. The utility function for a subproblem (4) We note that due to the presence of the binding intertemporal constraint, the hourly nodal prices are not given by the intersection of supply and demand curves in that hour. Also, in the first hour, the nodal price is below the average variable cost of the firm and it suffers a financial loss in that hour. However, in the second hour, the firm operates profitably with high margin. Due to the ramping constraint, it is overall profitable for the firm to produce some power in the first hour (incurring financial losses) to be able to produce more power in the second hour (with a profit exceeding the losses of the previous hour). As increases injection in the first hour, it lowers the nodal price in that hour and makes lower output in the first hour, which-due to the binding ramping constraint-results in lower production by in the second hour as well, thus increasing the nodal price in the second hour to compensate for higher economic losses per unit of power in the first hour. That is the mechanism of the nodal price increase in the second hour due to increase of power injection by in the first hour.
Mathematically, in , the upward ramping constraint is the only binding inequality constraint, and the set of binding constraints is unaltered and satisfies the constraint qualification at the solution. The kernel of is spanned by , and hence the Hessian of the Lagrangian function is invertible in the tangent space of the surface, defined by the binding constraints. Therefore, assumptions of the Proposition 1 hold and we have which agrees with the direct computation using (11) . This example shows that nodal price in the first hour depends on the firm injection in the second hour and vice versa. Thus, consideration of binding intertemporal constraints is important in multi-period DAM model. Also, the 2 2 matrix nodal price response matrix is negative semi-definite with eigenvalues , the null vector and the eigenvector are given by (1, 1) and , respectively. In the given example, changing production volumes by the same amount in each hour will not change the nodal prices, whereas increasing the injection in one hour and decreasing it by the same amount in the other hour is the most efficient way to exploit the sensitivity of nodal prices with respect to the firm production volumes [that also directly follows from (11) as the firm's injections enter the nodal prices only in combination].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied properties of the nodal price response in DAM with respect to infinitesimal injections of costless power by a firm , operating generating units assigned to different nodes. The constraint set of the DAM optimization problem includes (possibly, intertemporal) constraints on power consumption/production volumes specified by the market players and constraint set originating from the network (power flow equations, limits on power flows, etc.). We have shown that if the reduced set of binding constraint (defined as the full set of binding constraints excluding 's generating units constraints such as minimal/maximal output, ramping, etc.) does not induce any additional binding constraints on the production volumes by the firm , then (given validity of the other assumptions, stated in Proposition 1) the nodal price response matrix is symmetric and negative (semi-)definite for all hours of the day: matrix is symmetric under . Symmetry property of the nodal price response matrix is analogous to the statement of the reciprocity theorem for networks, which implies that if electromagnetic force insertion in one loop produces a current in another loop, then insertion by the electromagnetic force in the position of the current produces equal current in the first loop. That result is further extended in Proposition 2 for the case, when additional binding constraints are absent only for a subset of hours of the day. These findings can be viewed as generalization of results obtained in [5] and [9] to the case of power systems with nonlinear and intertemporal constraints.
APPENDIX
In this section, we recall some basic properties of the Lagrange multiplier derivatives over exogenous parameters in constrained optimization problem (12) with , where and are open subsets of Euclidean spaces and , respectively, is twice continuously differentiable objective function defined on , constraints are defined on and specify equality as well as weak inequality constraints. Functions are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable functions of the variables with specifying a set of exogenous parameters . The feasible set defined by for each is assumed to be nonempty compact (bounded and closed) set in . The extreme value theorem implies that for each , there exists at least one solution for belonging to the feasible set and maximizing (12) . We emphasize that under the stated assumptions, even if the objective function and constraints are smooth functions and there is unique maximizer of (12), the value function and maximizer of (12) in general case need not be continuous functions of the parameters .
We will make the following additional assumptions on (12) ]. A few consequences readily follow: assumption on twice continuous differentiability of implies that functions are also twice continuously differentiable, which-given continuity of in -implies continuity of in ; the latter coupled with assumption "d" entails that there is a neighborhood of , such that rank of is maximal in that neighborhood. Likewise, there is an open neighborhood of , such that assumption "e" is valid for all in that neighborhood.
The Lagrange method is applicable in some (the footnote 1 is applicable to the present section as well), and we have the following set of equations, representing the first-order necessary condition for a critical point :
supplemented with nonnegativity conditions for Lagrange multipliers associated with binding inequality constraints. Given the function , maximality of rank in allows to solve for , in some . Continuity of and twice continuous differentiability of as well as , imply that are continuous in that . It follows from [11] that rank of is maximal and , restricted to the kernel of , is invertible (with the latter condition present only if the kernel is nontrivial) if and only if the bordered Hessian matrix defined by (14) is invertible. We note that since determinant of is nonzero at and is continuous function of , it is also nonzero in some . It is well known [12] that nondegeneracy preserving substitution in the bordered Hessian matrix produces Jacobian matrix for a set of (13) . Hence, implicit function theorem implies that in some neighborhood of , there exists a unique (continuously differentiable with respect to ) solution of (13) . We stress that in general case that does not imply that the solution to (12) is unique and/or continuously differentiable as the implicit function theorem provides a local solution to the necessary condition for extremum, while the optimization problem might have multiple and/or discontinuous solutions. However, in our case, assumptions of uniqueness and continuity of solution of (12) in some neighborhood of implies that that solution is the one identified by the implicit function theorem, and there is such that is continuously differentiable function in that neighborhood. Since is twice continuously differentiable function and in the neighborhood the maximizer of (12) is unique and continuously differentiable, the value function for (12) defined by is also continuously differentiable in . Note that we can remove the assumption "e", if the assumption "a" is extended to require that is continuously differentiable functions in . In that case, the continuous differentiability of follows directly from utilizing constraint qualification, which entails that in some the matrix is invertible. Constraint qualification and also imply that a set does not impose any constraints on the possible values of [even for a case when the constraints do not have the form ]: there is no continuously differentiable function in some neighborhood of , such that it is a function of only: with and . That conclusion is compatible with the constant rank theorem.
The continuity of the function in some open neighborhood of , as stated in assumption "a", can be replaced by more fundamental assumptions on the constraints functions . One such example is given by the Berge's Maximal Theorem in the framework of constraints generated correspondence.
Economic interpretation of the Lagrange multiplies as shadow prices [13] is given by the Envelope Theorem [14] , which we reformulate below in a way suitable for our purposes. 
However, the function is continuously differentiable in ; hence, the value function is twice continuously differentiable in that neighborhood. That in turn implies (21) and, therefore, the square matrix is symmetric in . These results readily follow from using Since in the function is solution to (12) and bordered Hessian is invertible, the square matrix defines negative definite form in the kernel of , i.e., for preserving the constraints. However, as does not belong to the kernel due to the term in (22), in general case, (23) does not imply that is negative definite or negative semi-definite matrix. We note for the case of convex optimization problem, the negative semi-definiteness of in follows from (24). Also, (22) and assumed structure of entail that with any non-zero vector . Hence, for the cases of convex optimization problem with strictly concave function , the matrix is negative definite in .
